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I. INTRODUCTION
The patent law field has been ripe for exploitation in the past ten years by
"patent trolls"-holders of patents who do not practice the inventions but
instead hold large patent portfolios to exact licensing fees from legitimate
businesses.' The mere threat of lengthy litigation and an impending
injunction forces innovative industry leaders into unfavorable licensing
agreements.2 The online auction phenomenon eBay stood up to patent troll
MercExchange in 2006, allowing the United States Supreme Court to deliver
a landmark ruling on the issuance of injunctions after patent infringement is
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1 Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 868 F.2d 1226, 1232-34, 1246-47 (Fed.
Cir. 1989). The patent troll problem does not refer to patent-holding inventors who
license the rights to a bigger manufacturing company because they do not have the
resources to manufacture and sell (practice) the invention themselves. See Jeremiah Chan
& Matthew Fawcett, Footsteps of the Patent Troll, 10 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1, 1 (2005).
The problem refers to companies that buy up patent portfolios from inventing companies
with the sole goal of bringing infringement lawsuits to make a quick dollar from large
corporations, and the term was first used to describe these companies by Intel senior
counsel including David Simon. Id. at 1 n.2. For more on the current definition and
debate over patent trolls, see Patent Troll Tracker, a blog by Rick Frenkel, an in-house
patent counsel for Cisco. Patent Troll Tracker, http://trolltracker.blogspot.com (last
visited Feb. 23, 2008).
2 Alyson G. Barker, Patent Permanent Injunctions and the Extortion Problem: The
Real Property Analogy's Preservation of Principles of Equity, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'Y 256, 272 (2006). Barker analogizes the patent law problem to similar
"extortion" in real property transactions, where courts regularly deny an injunction if they
find the only reason for seeking an injunction is economic windfall.
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found.3 With the termination of patent troll reliance on automatic injunctions,
more corporations will likely follow eBay and take patent trolls to court.4 As
fewer settlements occur outside the courtroom, 5 alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) in the field stands at a crucial crossroads. Unless actions are taken
immediately, ADR may lose the biggest opportunity it has had to expand in
the critical patent law industry.
Part II of this Note provides the recent developments and history in the
patent law field giving rise to the eBay case and describes what happened at
the Supreme Court. Part III illustrates the immediate and long-term effects of
the eBay decision. Part IV examines the current role alternative dispute
resolution plays in the patent law field. In Part V, several possible solutions
to the eBay problem are discussed and analyzed. The best solutions to save
alternative dispute resolution in patent law and give hope for more expansion
of ADR into the field are: (1) increasing awareness in the patent law field of
ADR alternatives through formal training; and (2) legislative changes to the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act or the Patent Act in order to force more
parties into ADR processes.
II. THE LANDMARK DECISION AGAINST PATENT TROLLS
A. Historical Context
In patent litigation, once a court found a patent infringed, it originally
had the option of fashioning the correct remedy--damages, permanent
3 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006). The Supreme
Court rejected any automatic injunction rule the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals might
be using in the patent law context. See also MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401
F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
4 James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the
Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 193 (2006).
Although most scholars believe otherwise, McDonough makes a new argument that
patent trolls are not only good for patent law, but they should be encouraged as the next
evolutionary step in the development of patent law at large. Id. at 189. McDonough notes
that other fields like securities markets follow a similar development path, and patents
will be better off in the long run with patent trolls acting as an intermediary in the patent
market.
5 Robert E. Thomas, Vanquishing Copyright Pirates and Patent Trolls: The
Divergent Evolution of Copyright and Patent Laws, 43 AM. Bus. L.J. 689, 736-37
(2006). Thomas views the eBay decision as a vital step in the drive for Congressional
patent reform, which should also slow patent trolls. Id. at 738. For more on patent reform,
see infra notes 123-45 and accompanying text.
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injunction, or both-for the circumstances. 6 The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit was created in 1982 and has exclusive jurisdiction over all
patent law appeals and certain trademark appeals. 7 The reasons for creating a
separate circuit for patent appellate cases are twofold: (1) to provide
consistency and reliability in the patent laws by removing circuit splits of
opinion; and (2) to allow judges with special patent law experience and
expertise to decide cases as opposed to general circuit court judges.8 Faced
with the task of establishing the proper remedy for infringed patents, the
Federal Circuit fashioned a presumption of automatic permanent injunctions
for any case where infringement is found.9 The Federal Circuit based this
presumption upon the nature of patent law itself, which is centered upon the
granting of monopolies of useful articles for a limited period of time in
exchange for full disclosure of the useful article to the public.' 0
While the Federal Circuit's automatic injunction presumption did indeed
provide consistency in patent law, this decision opened the door for non-
practicing owners of patents-patent trolls-to more effectively threaten
large companies with lawsuits over infringed patents. 11 There have always
been legitimate patent owners who license the rights to make their inventions
because they lack the capability to manufacture or capital to invest in the
6 Robert C. Weiss & Thomas J. Brindisi, Dealing with the Willfulness Issue,
Including Bifurcation Motion Practice, 457 PLUPAT 151, 156 (1996).
7 United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, About the Court,
www.fedcir.gov/about.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2007). The Federal Circuit also has
jurisdiction to hear trademark appeals as well as other federal governmental affairs, but
the court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction only in patent law.
8 Thomas H. Case & Scott R. Miller, An Appraisal of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 301, 318-20 (1984); see also Charles W. Adams, The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: More Than a National Patent Court, 49 Mo. L.
REv. 43, 50 (1984).
9 Richardson, 868 F.2d at 1246-47 ("Infringement having been established, it is
contrary to the laws of property, of which the patent law partakes, to deny the patentee's
right to exclude others from use of his property."). The Federal Circuit disagrees with the
common perception that this injunction rule is automatic, but in practice the rule has
become automatic in every case where the court finds infringement. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 401 F.3d at 1338-39.
10 Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (saying
that an injunction is a proper remedy because "the right to exclude recognized in a patent
is but the essence of the concept of property").
I Chan & Fawcett, supra note 1, at 4-6. Chan and Fawcett give three prime
examples of technology used widely by consumers-eBay, Blackberry, and Microsoft
Explorer-that are at risk of being shut down by an injunction in a patent troll case. Id. at
5-6.
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invention. 12 The term patent troll appeared when an increasing trend emerged
over the past ten years of companies acquiring patents from true inventors or
innovative businesses for the sole purpose of threatening litigation and
extracting license fees from manufacturing companies. 13 Despite the grave
consequences a permanent injunction can have on a large business entity,
some of these companies have risked it all to take the patent trolls into court
and battle over the validity of patents and infringement. 14 Consequently, the
mere existence of patent trolls has increased litigation in the patent law field
dramatically. 15
Another recent development in patent law occurred when business
method patents were affirmed as patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.16 This determination has enlarged the patent field even more,
12 See id. at 2; see also Amy L. Landers, Let The Games Begin: Incentives to
Innovation in the New Economy of Intellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REv.
307, 308 (2006). Landers points out that not only have companies appeared on the scene
for the sole purpose of trolling activity, but legitimate patent holders have also tried to
"monetize" their dormant patents in a similar way. There are no abandonment provisions
in patent law like there are in trademark law, so a dormant patent will not be barred from
being enforced against later infringers.
13 The term was first used in the late 1990s by Peter Detkin, general counsel at Intel,
to describe patent holders who generally do not practice inventions. Over time this
definition has been refined to the meaning it has today. Jason Rantanen, Slaying the
Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy Against Patent Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 163-64 (2006).
14 Chan & Fawcett, supra note 1, at 5-6. Although Microsoft has enough other
products in the market to withstand an injunction on a current version of Explorer, the
companies behind eBay auction services (eBay Inc.) and Blackberry personal digital
assistants (Research in Motion, RIM) are really at risk in their respective litigation. Id. at
5. This is also proven by RIM settling for more than $600 million after losing its
infringement suit.
15 Id. at 4; Derek C. Stettner, Meet the Patent Enforcers, 77 Wis. LAw. 19, 20-21
(2004). The man who started companies down the path of trolling was Jerome Lemelson,
who for the past thirty years has patented broad ideas and waited for them to be infringed
by Fortune 500 companies. Id. Although Lemelson's tactics are clearly not what the
government intends when granting patents, the line blurs when manufacturing companies
stop creating a patented product and instead try to license it out for the quick monetary
value.
16 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 1998). A business method patent is a vague term, meaning a method of doing
business (such as a system of how salespeople should best handle certain customer
demands) as opposed to the means of carrying out the business (such as software that
tells salespeople how to handle these situations). Id. at 1376. The distinction has
essentially been eradicated by the current complexity of modem business systems. The
Federal Circuit announced that the business method exception to patentability was done
348
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generating many more opportunities for patent trolls to acquire business
method patents and threaten litigation against legitimate companies. 17 Both
the business method patent and the automatic injunction presumption finally
came into the spotlight when a patent troll targeted eBay over a business
method patent of online auction services in 2002.18
B. eBay v. MercExchange
Against the background of rising litigation and increasing patent troll
activity, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Federal
Circuit's rule of automatic injunctions. 19 Legal debate raged on both sides as
eBay put its own existence on the line by fighting MercExchange in court as
opposed to agreeing to the licensing fees MercExhange desired for the online
auction business method patent it possessed.20 Patent trolls and supporters
defended the automatic injunctions as necessary to maintain the vitality of
the entire patent system by guaranteeing the natural rights entitled to patent
owners upon infringement. 21 Large corporations and many scholars argued
otherwise, citing the need to stop rising litigation and undesirable bullying or
away with in 1952 when patent law adopted the obviousness requirement, but the
exception would clearly cause nothing but confusion in modem business cases. Id
Although the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have been extending patent rights like
this for many years, many scholars observe that recent decisions indicate the pendulum
swinging the other way now. See Steve Seidenberg, Reinventing Patent Law, ABA
JOURNAL ONLINE, http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/reinventingpatent-law (last
visited Feb. 23, 2008).
17 See Elizabeth D. Ferrill, Patent Investment Trusts: Let's Build a PIT to Catch the
Patent Trolls, 6 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 367, 368 (2005). Ferrill notes that the expansion in
patentable subject matter has helped lead to a tripling in the number of patents issued
annually since 1985.
18 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 789, 789 (E.D. Va. 2002).
For example, one of the business methods at issue here was the method of searching the
intemet for goods to purchase. Id. at 795.
19 eBay, Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 733.
20 MercExchange, L.L.C., 271 F. Supp. 2d at 789.
21 Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83
TEx. L. REv. 961, 1024 (2005); see also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers
in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 1575, 1615 (2003). Burk and Lemley debate whether the
different industries and different types of patent owners deserve different patent systems,
but they come to the conclusion that all patent owners should be covered by a unitary
system. Mann goes even further in defense of patent trolls by arguing that these
companies promote progress by allowing inventors to sell rights to big corporations
which have more resources to continue developing the state of the art.
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enforcement tactics of patent trolls.22 Even Congress weighed in on the
patent troll issue in 2005, deciding that injunctions should be harder to get
for "non-market participant" companies who are not actively using and
making their patented inventions.23 The future of not only eBay and its
millions of consumers, but perhaps also patent trolls hung in the balance as
the Supreme Court deliberated in the case.24
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Federal Circuit, stating that
automatic injunctions as a remedy for patent infringement does not make
sense.25 Ironically, the Court brought uniformity to patent law by discarding
the Federal Circuit ruling and by making the injunction remedy
determination the same as every other field of law. 26 For a patent owner to
get an injunctive remedy against an infringer, the owner must win the
balance of the following four traditional equitable factors: (1) irreparable
injury to the patent owner; (2) inadequacy of alternative remedies at law; (3)
22 Chan & Fawcett, supra note 1, at 1. Chan and Fawcett observe that the
government allows an inventor to have a patent primarily for the benefit of the public.
The patented material eventually goes into the public domain, and the patent holder can
continue to develop the state of the art by using and selling the invention to the public
and getting feedback on what improvements could be made. The public obviously
benefits in both ways, but a patent troll is a problem because holding patents to later
litigate for damages does not benefit the public. Indeed this activity harms the public
because it impedes development and discourages companies from bringing certain new
technologies to the public. Id. at 3-4.
23 William C. Rooklidge, Reform of the Patent Laws: Forging Legislation
Addressing Disparate Interests, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 9, 13-14 (2006).
Unfortunately, Congress left this part of the Patent Reform Act on the Capitol floor,
opening the door for the Supreme Court to make a decision on patent trolls. The patent
reform drive continues every year (for example, the I/S Journal at Ohio State recently
held a symposium in February 2007 on what patent law reforms should be supported),
and Congress could easily propose to add this extra layer of law at any point in the next
few years.
24 Barker, supra note 2, at 257-58. Obviously if the permanent injunction were
upheld and MercExchange decided to not license the business method to eBay, eBay
would shut down and online auction commerce would be crippled immediately. Barker
also compares this case to the similar Blackberry case, which could have hurt U.S.
businesses significantly if the majority of personal digital assistants used by executives
and employees were shut down by an injunction.
25 eBay, Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1841.
26 Id. at 1839 ("These familiar [equity] principles apply with equal force to disputes
arising under the Patent Act... [n]othing in the Patent Act indicates that Congress
intended [to depart from the principles of equity].").
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balance of hardships; and (4) public interest. 27 The only surprise in the case
was that the Court did not speak explicitly on patent troll activity or try to
prevent trolls from obtaining injunctions. 28 Consequently, the decision will
have immediate as well as long-term effects.
III. EFFECTS OF THE EBAYDECISION
A. Immediate Effects
In the first lower court applications of the equity four-factor injunction
test (eBay rule) for patent cases, there was enough wiggle room for judges to
deny permanent injunctions to most patent trolls because patent trolls have
trouble proving that monetary damages are inadequate. 29 The eBay rule has
not only affected business method patents and patent trolls, but also the rest
of patent law and other areas of law, such as copyright and trademark.30
Injunctive relief is obviously still possible for many patent owners whose
patents are infringed, but relief has become uncertain for more than just
27 Id. The Supreme Court indicated that even though the District Court claimed to
apply this four-factor test, it erred by holding that irreparable harm could never be shown
by a patent holder who prefers to license rather than practice. This would make any
patents held by legitimate small inventors like university professors useless. Each of the
factors is also generally given equal weight, making none of them completely decisive
either way. The Supreme Court also noted that the test for injunctive relief in the
analogous intellectual property field of copyright law is the traditional four-factor equity
test. Id. at 1840.
28 Parker H. Bagley, Outside Counsel.- Supreme Court Clarifies Standard for
Injunctions in Patent Cases, 5/25/2006 N.Y.L.J. 4, 4. Many scholars had thought that the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to fashion a rule against patent troll companies, but
clearly the review was simply to fix the Federal Circuit's interpretation of injunction law.
29 Thomas L. Casagrande, The Reach of eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.: Not
Just for Trolls and Patents, 44 DEC. Hous. LAW. 10, 16 (2006). The first three cases in
the Eastern District of Texas showed the breadth of possibilities under the eBay
approach: a patent troll was denied an injunction, a practicing manufacturer was denied
an injunction in a close equity balance, and another practicing manufacturer was granted
a permanent injunction. At least in patent law, the Supreme Court test appears to be
working to help solve the troll problem.
30 Id. at 12. The traditional four-factor equity test was expressly applied in eBay to
patent and copyright only. However, the holding extends to all statutes where injunctions
may be granted "in accordance with the principles of equity" or "on such terms as the
court may deem reasonable." Therefore, other areas of law such as trademark law and the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act are covered by this decision. Id. at 13-14.
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patent owners that are classified as patent trolls.31 The short term effects of
the eBay decision have not been surprising thus far, but time will tell if
district courts can uniformly apply the Supreme Court test and bring the
desired consistency the Federal Circuit is trying to achieve in patent law. 32
B. Long-Term Effects
Although the Supreme Court did not specifically write an opinion or
make a rule targeting patent troll activity, the Court did hurt trolls by making
it nearly impossible to get a permanent injunction in cases of infringement.33
Patent trolls used to be able to simply rely on the threat of an automatic
permanent injunction to force licensing agreements or settlements out of
court.34 Now the accused infringers have little reason to fear a court ruling
against them. Consequently, the uncertainty surrounding the type of relief
granted in these cases will increase the number of cases going to litigation.35
More litigation is a problem for courts and creates more inefficiency for the
corporations and individuals involved in the patent business. 36
31 Id. at 16. The eBay rule has already denied an injunction to one practicing and
manufacturing patent-holder; however, this is the correct result in cases where monetary
damages are the only proper remedy.
32 See Availability of Injunctive Relief, 120 HARv. L. REv. 332, 341. This simple
Supreme Court decision helps solve the patent troll problem by allowing local courts the
opportunity to determine if the circumstances compel an injunction. For most
circumstances where the plaintiff is a patent troll, the court will be able to deny injunctive
relief. Id at 336.
33 Bagley, supra note 28, at 4. In the patent troll context, it is very hard to prove
irreparable harm has been done or that monetary damages are not an adequate remedy at
law. Also, the public interest factor typically does not favor the patent troll.
34 Landers, supra note 12, at 307. While Landers focuses mostly on the exorbitant
damages patent trolls have been awarded in court, the more sinister effect of nearly
automatic injunctions was the money trolls could make in forced settlements. Landers
believes this is a problem because sometimes damages or license fees far exceed the true
economic value of a patent.
35 See Hon. Thomas G. Nelson, The Future of the Federal Courts: The Case for a
Mission Statement, 37-AUG. ADvOC. (IDAHo) 12, 14 (1994). Nelson warns against
increasing the number of federal appellate judges because more judges lead to more
instability and differences of opinion, which leads to uncertainty of outcomes and more
litigation. The concept of uncertainty of outcomes leading to more litigation is more
general than his article topic, as it extends to every area of the law including current
patent law. Therefore, more legitimate companies will contest patent infringement suits
from patent trolls because the outcome is uncertain.
36 See George M. Sirilla et al., Will eBay Bring Down the Curtain on Automatic
Injunctions in Patent Cases?, 15 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 587, 604-06 (2006). In the software
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In the patent troll context, less negotiation may appear like a good result
because patent trolls made negotiation too one-sided and coercive in the
past.37 While the eBay holding was a step in the right direction to stop the
patent troll problem, a further rise in litigation is just as insidious and must be
countered. 38 The alternative dispute resolution community has already made
inroads into the patent law world, but this recent Supreme Court decision
provides an invaluable opportunity for ADR to expand here.39 One of the
best ways to counteract the problem of rising litigation is to make alternative
dispute resolution a favorable option to opposing parties.40 Before attacking
the problem at hand, a look at how ADR currently operates in the patent law
field is necessary and appropriate.
IV. THE CURRENT ROLE OF ADR iN PATENT LAW
Before 1983, no measure of alternative dispute resolution was allowed in
patent law disputes.41 Congress enacted legislation in 1983 to allow
business for example, life cycles of the patented material can be very short and
inefficiency is created by any delay or interruption of service to consumers due to
impending litigation or possible injunctions.
37 See Ferrill, supra note 17, at 376 n.64. The patent troll aspect of patent law has
brought "the personal injury game" to the table, meaning that companies settle in one-
sided negotiation sessions more often in these contexts than in every other legal context.
Id. at 377.
38 Casagrande, supra note 29, at 16. The problems of inefficiency in time-sensitive
industries such as computer software are still compounded whether the problem is more
litigation or more possible injunctions.
39 Steven J. Elleman, Note, Problems in Patent Litigation: Mandatory Mediation
May Provide Settlements and Solutions, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 759, 767-68
(1997). Courts originally did not favor alternative dispute resolution in patent law
because strong public policy concerns are present in every patent validity and
infringement determination, dictating attention from federal courts exclusively.
Eventually in 1982, Congress determined the virtues of arbitration outweighed any risk of
threatened public interests, and alternative dispute resolution has been present in patent
law ever since.
40 See Anne K. Subourne, Motivations for Mediation: An Examination of the
Philosophies Governing Divorce Mediation in the International Context, 38 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 381, 394 (2003). Similar to the divorce context Subourne discusses, patent law
disputants can save a significant amount of money and time byconsidering alternative
dispute resolution options. Of course, the best side benefit is a reduced court docket and
overall efficiency of the dispute system.
41 Jennifer Mills, Alternative Dispute Resolution in International Intellectual
Property Disputes, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 227, 228 (1996). Again, the
government's view before 1980 was that it had to be involved in private disputes
353
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
arbitration and mediation in the field and to overcome the old presumption
that government had a duty to intervene in patent disputes involving any
public interest. 42 Over the course of the past twenty years, arbitration and
mediation have become increasingly popular among disputing parties in the
patent field. 43 The growth of ADR in patent law has been one of the
quickest-growing areas of alternative dispute resolution. 44 This section will
cover the three widely used alternative dispute resolution methods in patent
law disputes: arbitration, mediation, and negotiation.
A. Arbitration
Arbitration is basically a form of private judging where a knowledgeable
third-party decides the dispute.45 The lengthy discovery, evidentiary, and
appeals processes are all reduced, and these lower levels of formality help an
arbitrator decide a case much quicker than the classic judicial litigation
system.46 Arbitration usually arises as part of a contractual agreement to
license a patent, and circumstances are rare where two parties agree to
whenever the public had a significant interest to protect. As patent law is a deal between
individual inventors and the federal government representing the American public, every
patent case used to be in the general category of non-arbitrational.
42 Id. The first legislation can be found in the 1988 version of 35 U.S.C. § 294,
which provides rules for voluntary arbitration of disputes.
43 See Alan W. Kowalchyk, Resolving Intellectual Property Disputes Outside of
Court: Using ADR to Take Control of Your Case, 61 DIsP. RESOL. J., Jul. 2006, at 28, 30.
Not only does Kowalchyk notice the cost and time savings of alternative dispute
resolution, but he also notes the desire of some companies to stay out of a long public
trial where more than just patent problems may surface in discovery.
44 E. Casey Lide, ADR and Cyberspace: The Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution
in Online Commerce, Intellectual Property and Defamation, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 193, 207 (1996); S. Gale Dick, ADR at the Crossroads, 49 DISP. RESOL. J., Mar.
1994, at 47, 47. The intellectual property field is just like commercial law in that
networked communication between parties is highly encouraged, so this leads to a
landscape where alternative dispute resolution can grow faster than in other fields.
45 Jill I. Gross, Securities Mediation: Dispute Resolution for the Individual Investor,
21 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 329, 357 (2006). Arbitration is much like a court
proceeding in that both sides get to show their cases and a third party decides what
agreement should happen, but the proceedings are private and quicker. Gross argues that
arbitration allows perhaps a better opportunity than litigation to fully and fairly consider
all options of resolution.
46 Kowalchyk, supra note 43, at 30. An arbitrator's hourly fee is high compared to
costs in court, but generally parties still save money because the arbitration is
significantly shorter than any court proceeding.
[Vol. 23:2 20081
COUNTERING EFFECTS OF THE PATENT TROLL REVOLUTION
arbitrate a dispute already in progress.47 The key to figuring out the rules and
procedures of an arbitration proceeding will thus be found in the arbitration
clause itself.48 The two attributes that make arbitration so desirable in patent
law are the overall cost and time savings, and the fact that arbitration rulings
are enforceable at law.49 A final introductory note is that the parties must
notify the patent office of the arbitration award to make the award fully
enforceable at law. 50
The nature of patent trolls fighting big corporations usually does not
create a friendship between disputants; however, arbitration can help the
parties develop a successful business relationship. 51 All patent arbitrations
are subject to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which requires courts to
recommend-and even force-parties into arbitration if a contractual
agreement between the parties indicates that arbitration is to be used.52 While
all patent law appeals go through the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals,
limited appeals over patent arbitration agreements usually do not involve
patent law at all and, therefore, can be reviewed by other regional circuit
47 See id. Unless the licensing parties agree otherwise before a dispute arises, the
two parties will likely have trouble agreeing on anything including going to binding
arbitration proceedings. For patent trolls that do not even try to license the patent before
bringing a lawsuit, there is less likelihood of arbitration starting at any point. On the other
hand, trolls who show no willingness to license without good reason would almost
certainly lose in court when trying to obtain an injunction.
48 Id. at 31. Usually the specific rules of arbitration are not spelled out in detail on
the contractual agreement itself, but instead the agreement will specify an arbitration
agency such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA). Entities such as the AAA
have their own well-settled rules and procedures. Id. at 30-32.
4 9 Id. See also Thomas 0. Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74 U. CIN. L. REv. 329, 354
(2005). Main notes that more disputes in the United States are resolved using traditional
alternative dispute resolution practices than in courts of law currently. Id. at 341.
50 Kowalchyk, supra note 43, at 34; 35 U.S.C.A. § 294 (2006). Required notice for
each patent disputed includes "names and addresses of the parties, the name of the
inventor, the name of the patent owner... [the] number of the patent, and a copy of the
award." Id.
51 See MICHAEL BUHLER ET AL., PRACTITIONER'S HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 9 (Frank-Bemd Weigand ed., 2002). A patent troll and a practicing
corporation coming to a friendly licensing/business relationship is a huge possible victory
for patent law.
52 M.A. Smith et al., Arbitration of Patent Infringement and Validity Issues
Worldwide, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 299, 321-22 (2006). Many states also have separate
arbitration laws that may apply, but only to the extent that the arbitration covers non-
substantive patent law issues. The FAA still applies even if the parties do not agree
contractually to arbitrate before going to court, which is the most likely case in patent
troll disputes.
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courts of appeal. 53 The process of arbitration has a solid rule structure and
many obvious benefits to patent disputants. Consequently, it comes as no
surprise that arbitration is already solidly entrenched in United States patent
dispute resolution.54 Arbitration alone cannot completely solve the problem
of higher caseloads in public courts involving patent law, 55 but there are
other alternative dispute resolution methods for disputants to consider.
B. Mediation
Mediation is a completely different procedure from arbitration. 56
Arbitration seeks to adjudicate disputes in an alternative forum, whereas
mediation attempts to formulate a negotiated solution to the problem at
hand.57 In addition, there are few rules in mediation, and the basis of
resolving the dispute lies in the creativity and willingness of the mediator and
53 Id. at 323. Of course if there is any question of patent law or mixture of patent law
questions with non-patent law questions, the Federal Circuit will have jurisdiction as
normal. Smith is just pointing out that many appeals of patent arbitration agreements deal
only with contracts or arbitration law, which can easily be dealt with by the other circuits.
54 See id. at 320-28. In other countries or in international patent disputes, arbitration
does not have all the same support and benefits as it does in the United States.
Nevertheless, increasing arbitration in the US patent law field can only encourage the
same ADR movements worldwide.
55 See Marion M. Lim, Note, ADR of Patent Disputes: A Customized Prescription,
Not an Over-The-Counter Remedy, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 155, 168 (2004). Lim
attempts to argue that both arbitration and mediation will not solve increased litigation in
patent law disputes because patent attorneys and large corporations "do not generally
embrace either as a means for resolving patent disputes." Id. Lim bases her thesis on
many reasons, including public interest being involved in patent disputes, both parties
wanting their day in court, and arbitrators being less impartial than judges. Id. at 174-87.
These are all arguments that were dismissed when Congress initially allowed ADR into
the patent field in 1982, and therefore hold little weight (if any) today. With the new
context of injunctions being difficult to obtain, many patent litigators would probably be
open to reconsidering these traditional alternative dispute resolution methods again.
56 Jeffrey M. Senger, Advocacy in Mediation with the Government, 61 DisP. RESOL.
J., Jan. 2007, at 50, 50-51. Litigation tactics (that could help in arbitration proceedings)
do nothing but hinder a mediation session, and the disputing parties need to recognize
this before mediation can proceed smoothly.
57 See Gerald F. Phillips, May Arbitrators Suggest Mediation?, 61 DisP. RESOL. J.,
Jan. 2007, at 28, 29. Phillips tackles the interesting debate of whether arbitrators should
suggest mediation as a better vehicle for resolving disputes, and he comes to the
conclusion that arbitrators indeed should encourage mediation first. The parties certainly
have a chance for more open dialogue and creative solutions in mediation.
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both parties to work together to come to an acceptable solution. 58 Even if
mediation does not bring the parties together to one final solution, the
disputants can still find some common ground which will not need to be
litigated in court.59
Mediation comes in two flavors: court-connected and private. 60 Court-
connected mediation occurs when the parties wish to mediate while litigating
in court.61 The results of a court-connected mediation are public (only the
settlement portion, not the private discussions with the mediator) and used to
help resolve the litigation. 62 Private contractual mediation usually arises from
the same contract clause as arbitration in licensing agreements. 63 Patent cases
do not settle in mediation as frequently as in other fields, so the ADR
community has room to improve the efficiency and success rates for all kinds
of patent disputes.64 Certainly in the worst of cases, mediation and arbitration
58 Kowalchyk, supra note 43, at 32. Disputing parties can come to solutions such as
cross-licensing or even joint development ventures in mediation. There are no limits to
the possible outcomes in mediation when both parties are open to finding creative
solutions.
59 Id. The parties have complete control over what kind of settlement comes out of
mediation, and the mediator cannot decide any issue for the parties like an arbitrator
would. Despite this limit on mediators, the parties can still leave mediation with an
agreement on some terms that will hasten the process of later arbitration or litigation.
60 Id. at 32-33. The key difference between the two kinds of mediation is that the
parties can choose a mediator both parties know and are comfortable with when engaged
in private mediation.
61 Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, Look Before You Leap and Keep on Looking:
Lessons From the Institutionalization of Court-Connected Mediation, 5 NEV. L.J. 399,
401 (2005). The mediator is generally chosen by the courts in this type of mediation. Id.
at 400.
62 See Judith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public
Dimensions of Court-Based Processes are at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521, 568
(2006). This publicity of the settlement itself is no different than that of the private
arbitration system, but an even greater emphasis exists in mediation on keeping
conversations with the mediator private. This allows the parties to feel relaxed and
encourages honesty and good faith in trying to come to an agreement with no unfair
disadvantages to either party if the mediation attempt fails in the end.
63 See Kowalchyk, supra note 43, at 30. In the patent troll context, this pre-arranged
contractual agreement is highly unlikely to be present. Nevertheless, the two parties in a
patent troll dispute can still choose a private mediation session on their own before a
lawsuit brings the parties in front of a judge formally.
64 International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution, A New Addition to
CPR's Master Guide Book Series, 24 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 22, 23 (2006).
The ADR community is currently publishing many books and law review articles on how
to improve mediation in patent law, an area where mediation is underused.
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will not provide a solution, and court litigation may need to be employed to
resolve the dispute. However, ADR methods at least give patent disputants a
chance to save themselves from the lengthy and costly trial process. 65 There
is one final possibility before the parties must turn back to litigation though,
and that is negotiation.
C. Negotiation
Negotiation is not much different from mediation, with the one crucial
difference being the lack of a third party present to help the parties discuss
the issues.66 Negotiations can therefore be a little harder and a little more
litigious because the parties have no choice but to work with one another
across the bargaining table.67 The classic method of negotiation is called
distributive negotiation or positional negotiation, where both parties make
initial offers and then slowly compromise on terms to meet somewhere in the
middle. 68 The more heralded version of negotiation is interest-based
negotiation, where creative solutions-which allow mutual gain and
objective criteria-are used to help parties focus on making both parties
better off as opposed to each party focusing on personal positions.69
In the patent troll context, negotiation most often takes the role of pre-
litigation dispute resolution because licensing agreements are traditionally
65 See, e.g., Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize Products Co., 185 F.3d 1341
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (a patent suit filed originally in 1981 still needed damages issues
resolved 18 years later). Obviously with the patent grant only lasting twenty years and
litigation sometimes extending for a decade or more, parties are well-inclined to avoid
litigation and come to a solution quickly in order to preserve the value of the patent.
66 See generally Alain Burrese, Success is in the Planning, 31 MONT. LAW. 32, 32
(Aug. 2006). Without a mediator present, the two parties must prepare thoroughly in
advance of the negotiation session if the negotiation is to be successful. Both parties need
to come in with a plan and know how to work in the negotiation forum.
67 Id. at 32-33. The key to good negotiations is figuring out how to most effectively
express your party's interests and demands to the other party.
68 H. Thomas Fehn et al., Securities Arbitration Mediator Model SAM User's
Manual, 1554 PLI/CoRP 245, 250 (2006). Fehn observes that this classic model of
negotiations is the least effective but most popular because this type of negotiation is
practically taught to every person in elementary school.
69 F. Peter Phillips, Speeches Spreading the Word on Business ADR: Assessing
Recent Efforts.. . and Looking Forward, 25 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 3, 7
(2007). Phillips points out that this interest-based negotiation has been refined ever since
its creation in 1981 by Roger Fisher and William Ury.
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hammered out in a negotiation. 70 One minor problem relevant to patent troll
disputes is that some courts have denied an alleged patent infringer the right
to move for a declaratory judgment if the infringer was the party that
terminated licensing negotiations. 71 The major problem of one-sided patent
troll licensing negotiations has diminished now that the Supreme Court nixed
the automatic injunction presumption. 72 This has allowed patent law to move
back into the realm of negotiations-as well as mediations and arbitrations-
effectively to resolve disputes.73 Despite this foothold in the patent law
system, the alternative dispute resolution community now needs to come up
with more solutions in order to increase the role these three ADR processes
play in patent law disputes.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE EBAYPROBLEM
Knowing that mediation, arbitration, and negotiation are already finding
a foothold in the wide world of patent litigation, where can ADR continue to
grow and help solve the issue of an increase in litigation from the patent troll
problem? There are many avenues to consider, but the most obvious solution
is to increase awareness of ADR possibilities in the field.74 Whether by
instituting required formal training for all patent lawyers or by spreading
goodwill through word-of-mouth, ADR offers many possible choices on how
70 David B. Conrad, Mining the Patent Thicket: The Supreme Court's Rejection of
the Automatic Injunction Rule in eBay v. MercExchange, 26 REV. LiTIG. 119, 141 (2007).
The terms of a negotiated agreement at the early pre-litigation stage can be much more
reasonable than the "reasonable" royalties awarded by courts later on. Id.
71 Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents,
91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 144 (2006). In theory, this allows the holder of an invalid patent to
force licensing negotiations on a legitimate manufacturer and then have an advantage in
court if the "infringer" breaks negotiation talks. By allowing patent trolls or holders of
invalid patents this advantage later, no encouragement exists for a good faith negotiation
strategy from the patent troll (if the troll would even have one to begin with). Courts
simply have to see that neither party should be penalized for breaking off negotiations
because the reasons may not always be in bad faith.
72 Yixin H. Tang, Recent Development, The Future of Patent Enforcement After
eBay v. MercExchange, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 235, 242-43 (2006). Tang cites eBay to
note that a patent holder with a patent that covers just a small portion of the large
infringing product has even less right to an injunction in the patent troll context. Id.
73 See supra Parts IV.A and IV.B.
74 International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution, Model Mediator
Standards are Revised, but Commercial Applications are Questioned, 23 ALTERNATIVE
To HIGH COST LITIG. 154, 154 (2005). The American Bar Association is a critical avenue
of educating lawyers, as this institute points out.
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to engage the patent law community further.75 There are also possibilities for
stricter requirements on patent licensing agreements and patent troll
companies. 76 Furthermore, Congressional action towards expansion in the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act for the patent law field or in the Patent
Act itself could help ADR infiltrate a greater percentage of patent disputes. 77
This Congressional action appears to be the best option because many
scholars and attorneys have been notably pushing for patent system reform
for the past five years.78 Each of these possibilities is discussed in turn as
follows.
A. Increasing Awareness of ADR Possibilities in Patent Law
Increasing patent lawyer awareness of ADR possibilities must affect both
kinds of patent lawyers: prosecutors and litigators. 79 Patent prosecutors deal
with the transactional side of the business, and their willingness to engage in
arbitration or even mediation on behalf of the patent holder is critical to the
75 See infra Parts V.A. 1 and V.A.2.
76 Doug Harvey, Reinventing the U.S. Patent System: A Discussion of Patent Reform
Through an Analysis of the Proposed Patent Reform Act of 2005, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV.
1133, 1162 (2006). One of the ways patent trolls abuse the patent system is by filing
continuing applications on their vague patents in order to extend the patent term long
enough to have a big corporation infringe the patent. Regulating continuation applications
is one example of how the Patent and Trademark Office could weed out the patent trolls
and eliminate abuse of this continuation system.
77 See Mark D. Janis, Second Tier Patent Protection, 40 HARv. INT'L L.J. 151, 185
(1999). Janis notes that there are concerns about forcing ADR onto patent disputants, but
these concerns are never articulated or explained.
78 See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.
1495, 1495-97 (2001). Lemley observes that even back in 2001 patent reform proponents
were loudly complaining that too many bad patents were being granted. Lemley disagrees
that patent reform will work because the number of patents that need heavy United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO or PTO) or judicial review is minimal. Id. at
1497-98. With the rise in litigation over the past six years and the new patent troll
problem on top of this rise, his main argument is unpersuasive today.
79 See Kevin R. Casey, International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution,
Law Firm ADR Departments Can Respond to Market Challenges, 25 ALTERNATIVES TO
HIGH COST LITIG. 1, 9-10 (2007). Casey argues that every law firm (intellectual property
included) should have an ADR department and all attorneys need to be trained in ADR,
or else they will not be able to provide complete and competent advice to their clients.
Some fields and states have required attorneys to pursue ADR education as an ethical
obligation, but patent law is not one of these fields yet.
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success of the ADR process. 80 Patent prosecutors develop the ground upon
which disputes arise by creating the patents themselves, so an ADR-educated
prosecution profession will perhaps help resolve problems before they start
with more careful drafting and filing.81 Patent prosecutors also have an
opportunity to work with 100% of clients (whereas patent litigators only
work with the small percentage of clients in patent disputes), so prosecutors
probably hold a critical role in spreading goodwill about ADR processes to
all future patent holders. 82 Proper transactional planning by patent
prosecutors can certainly play a role in the reduction of patent litigation, but
the real emphasis should be on educating patent litigators.83
Patent litigators must know about ADR and must be taught to encourage
or even compel patent disputants to try mediation or arbitration before taking
a long battle into court. 84 Litigators have a tendency to think recommending
alternative dispute resolution makes them appear weak in the eyes of clients,
80 Sean B. Seymore, The Competency of State Courts to Adjudicate Patent-Based
Malpractice Claims, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 443, 448-49 (2006). Patent prosecutors already
follow four sets of ethical rules: (1) the disciplinary rules of the state they practice in; (2)
the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility; (3) the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct; and (4) the USPTO Code of Professional Responsibility. Id. The
USPTO as well as the ABA could easily add an ethical requirement of patent prosecutors
to consider ADR when drafting patents just like they consider what issues may come up
in future litigation.
81 John J. Okuley, Note, Resolution of Inventorship Disputes: Avoiding Litigation
Through Early Evaluation, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 915, 955 (2003). Okuley
discusses the non-traditional role patent prosecutors must take sometimes of investigating
who actually invented the patented device (one of the requirements for obtaining a patent
is disclosing the actual inventor on the patent application). This is just part of the careful
process that patent prosecutors must follow in drafting patents, so it is not going to be
that much harder to draft patents with future ADR concerns in mind.
82 See id. Patent prosecutors set the table up front for how litigation will go later on
in a patent's life. Consequently, patent prosecutors are in a perfect position to recommend
things such as further inventor experimentation to better support the claims or
recommend ADR procedures for future licensing agreements.
83 Marshall J. Breger, Should an Attorney Be Required to Advise a Client of ADR
Options?, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427, 434 (2000). Breger finds that while all litigators
should certainly be encouraged to inform clients about ADR options, a stiff rule requiring
or compelling litigators to pursue other options would not be a positive ethical
improvement.
84 Id. Note the critical difference here between compelling a client to use ADR and
compelling litigators to do the same. Compelling a client to use ADR is within the ethical
responsibilities and advisory capacity of a patent litigator, while forcing patent litigators
to always advise ADR would usurp the attorney's ability to judge the circumstances of
the case at hand. Id.
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and this misperception must be corrected if ADR is to flourish in this field.85
Once a client resolves a dispute in mediation or arbitration, the time and
money the client will save instead makes the lawyer who recommends these
procedures a hero in the eyes of the client.86 Patent litigators supporting the
use of ADR methods can help decrease litigation from patent trolls. 87 The
critical issue is not necessarily to whom the virtues of alternative dispute
resolution need to be extolled, but more importantly, how these virtues are to
be revealed.
1. Word-of-Mouth Recommendations
The first method is just word-of-mouth, which has been an effective way
to direct clients and lawyers into ADR processes since 1983 (at least in
patent law).88 As more judges and patent attorneys have positive experiences
using alternative dispute resolution methods, the word will naturally spread
to others in the patent law profession. 89 There is not too much to say on this
side except that the responsibility for starting this word-of-mouth
85 Donald E. Paulson & Diane E. Kenty, Advising Clients of ADR Before Filing a
Lawsuit: A Perspective, 40 BOSTON B.J. 6, 20 (1996). Paulson and Kenty propose that an
express requirement or guideline instructing all attorneys to inform clients about ADR
options before litigating on the client's behalf would be highly beneficial to get around
this silly misconception.
86 See id. While a handful of clients may indeed initially think an attorney is
showing weakness by offering alternative dispute resolution tactics, these clients will
undoubtedly change their minds when the dispute is resolved effectively, quickly, and
cheaply (the three things litigators have trouble accomplishing).
87 See Carl A. Kukkonen III, The Use of a Patent Licensing Center as an
Intermediary for Facilitating the Licensing of Commercially Viable, Unused Patents, 3
VA. J.L. & TECH. 10, 12 (1998). Kukkonen proposes that with the current realization that
patents can be strategically exploited (an early description of patent trolling), a central
patent licensing center using ADR methods could remove a lot of the modem patent
litigator's cases into the ADR forum.
88 Thomas R. Donahue & Barbara C. Deinhardt, Survey: ADR Use Increasing, 15
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 66, 68 (1997). By the mid-90s, most large
companies had a chance to try ADR in a business dispute, and the good results
(especially with certain mediators) spread by word-of-mouth from company to company.
89 Survey Shows Pervasive Use of ADR in Large Corporations, 8 WORLD ARB. &
MEDIATION REP. 99, 99 (1997). A Cornell University survey not only shows that nearly
100% of America's largest corporations favor ADR over litigation, but also that
mediators and ADR methods are chosen based on word-of-mouth and reputation. Id.
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recommendations system falls upon the leading ADR scholars as well as
leading patent law scholars. 90
Another method of word-of-mouth recommendations is through patent
clientele.91 A similar process can ensue where large corporations or small
inventors have success in patent ADR processes and then advise other
corporations and inventors to do the same. 92 Clients spreading the word may
be more effective than the patent lawyer society because clients hold the
ultimate decision about whether to utilize ADR.93 While word-of-mouth will
certainly be an easy way to help advance ADR in the patent law field, this
alone is not an adequate solution to the patent troll problem.
2. Additions to the CLE and Law School Required Curriculum
Another possible method is requiring training in alternative dispute
resolution as a part of the required continuing education curriculums at all
patent firms around the world.94 An emphasis on continuing legal education
(CLE) will not only allow new lawyers to learn what they need to know
90 The leaders in each field are best equipped to inform patent attorneys of the merits
of all ADR processes. These leaders also play a critical role in keeping attorneys
informed about the current cutting-edge or state of the art in patent law, so it is natural for
ADR encouragement to be most effective through these industry leaders.
91 See Scott H. Blackmand & Rebecca M. McNeill, Alternative Dispute Resolution
in Commercial Intellectual Property Disputes, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1709, 1710-11 (1998).
Blackmand and McNeill condone and explain the uses of ADR in all the major
intellectual property fields, and they point out that there are few times when counsel
should not tell clients to consider ADR. These times occur in "bet the company"
situations, meaning too much risk is involved to avoid trial. Id. at 1711.
92 See id. Clients are more likely to recommend ADR to other inventors or patent-
holders because good experiences with technically-adept arbitrators or mediators tend to
get clients talking. Clients are also more likely to recommend ADR to others because
both parties generally win in ADR patent proceedings (one party usually receives money
and the other receives some rights to practice the invention). Id. at 1716.
93 Id. Again, a client's advice to other clients may be more persuasive than even
legal counsel recommendations because former clients have actually experienced the
benefits of ADR personally.
94 Dori Cohen, Note, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Less
Alternative: The Need for ADR as Both a Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
Requirement and a Bar Exam Topic, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 640, 649 (2006). Cohen is
specifically speaking to divorce lawyers and family law ADR practitioners, but the
increase of ADR in that field is a nice analog to the similar possible ADR increase in
patent law. State legislatures enact CLE requirements in order to keep attorneys up to
date with the cutting edge of law. Id. Training in alternative dispute resolution is crucial
because this topic was not taken by a lot of law students in the past.
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about ADR, but also the leading partners and experts of patent firms.95 One
argument against this plan is that it may be unrealistic to expect continuing
education requirements to adequately cover this whole new topic while also
trying to keep patent lawyers educated on the cutting edge of technology and
science. 96 Nevertheless, training in alternative dispute resolution tactics and
strategy will not need to be done separately from technical or patent
training.97 ADR could simply be one panel discussion out of four or five in a
symposium.98 Practice in ADR techniques could also come at the same time
patent practitioners learn how to work with new technologies; for example,
imagine a CLE course where patent litigators work through three mock cases
in a new technological field, one of which is dealt with in mediation or
arbitration.99 Minor changes like these can advance the ADR agenda in
patent law without overburdening the CLE process. 100 The only way to truly
train current patent attorneys in the ADR field is to offer more CLE options,
and thus it appears to be one of the best options for spreading the good news
about ADR.
95 Cohen indicates that the practice of law without formal training in ADR today is
against the goal of the legal profession and against consumer protection from malpractice
offered by CLE programs. Id.
96 Numerous attorneys are reprimanded with fines, suspensions, or disbarment from
state bar associations every year for not complying with CLE requirements already, so
adding more requirements could cause even more attrition against CLE. See Jay M.
Zitter, Discipline of Attorney for Failure to Comply with Continuing Legal Education
Requirements, 96 A.L.R. 5th 23 (2002).
97 The New York State Bar Association supports adding ADR into regular
mandatory CLE required courses, implying that ADR can work side-by-side with the
usual technical training in all fields. NEW YORK STATE BAR AssocIATION, COMMrIrEE
ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, BRINGING ADR INTO THE NEW MILLENNIUM-
REPORT ON THE CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE DIRECTION OF ADR IN NEW YORK 55-57
(1999), available at http://nysba.org/MSTemplate.cfm?MicrositelD=84 (last visited Mar.
6, 2007).
98 Although many symposia dealing with alternative dispute resolution focus solely
on those procedures, the patent law reform symposium at The Ohio State University
Moritz College of Law in February 2007 could have easily had another 45 minute panel
discussion on ADR (none of the other panel discussions focused on the issue).
99 Cohen, supra note 94, at 649. ADR courses in CLE seminars are most effective
when small groups of attorneys (around 20) work on sample cases with a certified
mediator in the field. This type of activity would also provide a nice break from the
normal panel discussion routine of the day.
100 Furthermore, forty states require some form of CLE training for all attorneys, so
these minor changes would reach a vast majority of patent lawyers in the United States.
Id.
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The easier half of this formal training initiative is requiring a basic ADR
course in all the accredited law schools in America.10 By training
tomorrow's patent law workforce in the nuances and benefits of ADR, future
clients are more likely to hire a patent attorney trained for recommending as
well as participating in ADR. 10 2 The newly trained lawyers will also be able
to gradually convince senior partners of the merits of ADR in patent law
disputes by participating in ADR processes and helping clients come to a fast
and inexpensive solution. 10 3 Most schools already offer good training in the
ADR field, so the only extra requirement would be to make an introductory
course in ADR mandatory for all students similar to the introductory courses
in other fields, such as criminal or property law. 104 Alternative Dispute
Resolution touches every field of law today, and there may even be
justification to add ADR subject material to state bar examinations. 10 5 This
bar addition would naturally follow from forcing all the law schools to
include an ADR course requirement in their curricula. 10 6 Although these
solutions are not going to finish the job at hand, they are a good start for
increasing positive views and awareness of ADR.
101 See ANDREW I. SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY:
INTERDISCIPLINARY MODELS FOR DIVORCING FAMILIES 136-37 (Cambridge Univ. Press
2004). Two pioneers in ADR course offerings have been The Ohio State University
Moritz College of Law and Harvard Law School. Other law schools could learn from
how successful the ADR Certificate program has been at Ohio State. The demand for
these courses is clear: now law schools have to step up and meet the demand.
102 Cohen, supra note 94, at 650. Training attorneys in ADR at the law school level
is the only way to have "a lasting impact" on the field, be it patent law or family law. Id.
103 This process of training new lawyers and filtering the knowledge through to
older attorneys down the road is a common way to infiltrate any field (law, engineering,
etc.) with a new or better process.
104 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. The use of ADR has increased
significantly in all fields including the typical first year subjects of tort, criminal, and
property law. Consequently, it makes perfect sense to add ADR as a mandatory
requirement in addition to the traditional fields. Cohen, supra note 94, at 651.
105 NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 97, at 55. This process
happened recently in many states, including New York, when professional responsibility
was added to bar exams across the country. Alternative dispute resolution is just as
important to new lawyers today as professional responsibility. Cohen, supra note 94, at
650.
106 Alternatively, adding ADR to the state bar exam would undoubtedly force many
more law schools to offer ADR courses and encourage many more students to take ADR
courses while in law school. "Most law students select law school courses which will aid
them in passing the bar examination." Cohen, supra note 94, at 650-51.
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B. Legislative or Administrative Action Options
Another possible avenue is convincing the legislature to expand upon or
pass new laws requiring ADR programs in federal courts. The Alternative
Dispute Resolution Act already requires that federal courts give litigants in
all fields the option of court-connected ADR programs such as mediation. 10 7
This Act also requires an officer of the court to evaluate the effectiveness of
ADR programs each court offers and encourages courts to improve existing
ADR options. 10 8 While this legislation is very broad and far-reaching,
perhaps Congress could pass another smaller act or addendum to the ADR
Act for district courts acting in patent law cases. 109 This new legislation
could require any district court to not only passively provide ADR programs,
but also highly encourage the use of mediation or arbitration before
expensive discovery takes place in preparation to litigate.1 10 By requiring the
parties to sign a waiver of ADR possibilities at the outset of a patent trial in
order to continue litigation, a district court could at least force the patent
attorneys and parties to seriously consider keeping the dispute out of court.IlI
This kind of legislation would affect patent troll cases as well as other
patent cases, which is desirable because reducing the patent caseload in every
area is a commendable goal.1 12 The hardest part of this option is getting this
kind of legislation (or any kind of legislation for that matter) through both
houses of Congress and signed into law.' 13 Many Congressional attempts to
107 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-58 (West 2006).
108 28 U.S.C.A. § 651 (West 2006).
109 Arbitration of patent disputes is allowed under 35 U.S.C. § 294 already, but this
provision is only permissive and not compelling or mandatory. Congress has shown the
desire to compel ADR in patent law, but perhaps Congress will need to write a stronger
bill into law to achieve this objective. Elleman, supra note 39, at 775.
110 Lim, supra note 55, at 157-58. The lengthy discovery, prior art searches, and
Markman hearings can all be replaced with one cost-effective arbitration or mediation.
This is why ADR is such a good economic choice for most clients.
111 Congress has encouraged federal district courts to experiment with different
types of ADR ever since 1990 when it passed the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA). John
Maull, ADR in the Federal Courts: Would Uniformity Be Better?, 34 DuQ. L. REV. 245,
245-46 (1996).
112 CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, Mediation Motivation and
Encouragement. How International Organizations Build ADR, 23 ALTERNATIVES TO
HIGH COST LITIG. 81, 82 (2005). The Institute does observe that caseload reduction
should not be the only reason or the main reason to adopt ADR procedures, but this
clearly is a laudable result of increasing ADR.
113 Susan Jane M. Brown, David and Goliath: Reformulating the Definition of "The
Public Interest" and the Future of Land Swaps After the Interstate 90 Land Exchange, 15
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resolve this patent troll problem ended up being cut out of patent reform acts
because it is very hard to get a solid consensus from both conservatives and
liberals on statutory language. 14 When it comes to ADR regulation though,
Congress is probably more likely to see past the party lines to the important
goal of helping patent disputants as well as federal courts. 115
Another legislative or executive method of encouraging ADR
participation could be to require all patent licensing agreements to have an
ADR clause. This could come in an executive regulatory order from the
Patent and Trademark Office or Congress could create a federal statute in the
Patent Code.1 6 In either case, the requirement would be attached to the grant
of patent so that any licensing away of the patent owner's rights must include
a clause for mediation or arbitration somewhere in the agreement."17 This
alternative may be the most effective solution and would get the objective
completed; however, this kind of regulation or statute could be deemed to
take away constitutionally-mandated choice or right to trial. 18 Any
constitutional challenge or question is one the ADR community at large
should avoid, as public perception and positive feedback is how ADR
thrives. 119 Nevertheless, on a scale of possible solutions to the growing
litigation problem, every plausible possibility must be considered.
J. ENVTL. L. & LrrIG. 235, 259 (2000). No matter the context (Brown focuses on a piece
of environmental legislation), public support must outweigh public opposition, which is a
slow process in the patent law reform field. Id.
114 There has been no patent reform act to make it off the Congressional floor thus
far this decade, and this is probably in part due to how long it takes to build a dual-party
consensus.
115 ADR reforms or bills in many fields including patents have a tendency of being
passed very quickly by Congress. See Elleman, supra note 39, at 769.
116 1 believe a Congressional statute is far more likely, but the USPTO does have the
administrative rulemaking capability to add this requirement to all patent license
agreements.
"17 See Smith et al., supra note 52, at 302. Arbitration and mediation frequently
occur because the parties agree in licensing negotiations to arbitrate all later disputes.
Extending these procedures to regular patent disputes makes plenty of sense to make
disputes uniform whether or not there was a license agreement before the dispute. Id.
118 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
119 Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as "Litigation Lite:" Procedural and Evidentiary Norms
Embedded Within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289, 1347 (1998).
Sabatino illustrates the cycle of ADR being attentive to clients, which causes more
positive feedback and brings more clients into ADR.
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C. Joining the Patent Reform Movement
Returning again to the patent reform topic briefly touched on above, the
alternative dispute resolution community may have its best chance to
currently increase ADR use in patent law as a part of the ever increasing
drive to reform the patent laws. 120 There are multiple problems arising in
patent law currently, so the pressure on Congress to fix patent law is
currently at a maximum. 121 The first problem is that too many bad patents are
being granted. Additionally, the ridiculously backlogged patent office docket
has resulted in more and more bad patents getting through the system
filters. 122 The development of "patent thickets," which means the situation
where building a common device, such as a DVD player, requires licensing
of as many as 290 patents held by many different patent holders in the DVD
industry, is a debatable problem with the patent system right now as well. 123
Additionally, reform proponents highlight the patent troll economy as a
leading problem to fix in the field. 124 Each of these problems has occurred
for various reasons, but the underlying cause of all patent law problems is
almost definitely uncertainty (with respect to patent enforceability and patent
law generally). 125 This uncertainty stems from seemingly random judicial
decision trends in patent law as well as low patent quality in the last fifteen
120 Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One
Not To), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 149-50 (2007).
121 Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA? What the Patent
System can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEo. L.J. 269, 270 (2007). Large patent
reform bills have been left on the legislative floor in 2005 and 2006, so it is only a matter
of time before one merits serious debate and votes in Congress.
122 Andrew Kopelman, Note, Addressing Questionable Business Method Patents
Prior to Issuance: A Two-Part Proposal, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2391, 2402-03 (2006).
123 See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 121, at 303, 307. Obviously, the DVD example
illustrates that patent thickets force the patentees to work together, or else nobody will be
able to profit or make DVD players.
124 Robert E. Thomas, Vanquishing Copyright Pirates and Patent Trolls: The
Divergent Evolution of Copyright and Patent Laws, 43 AM. Bus. L.J. 689, 692-93
(2006).
125 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons For Patent Policy From Empirical
Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 2 (2005). Bessen and Meurer
point out these two types of uncertainty in the patent system and then propose what
reform could do to solve the problems.
[Vol. 23:2 20081
COUNTERING EFFECTS OF THE PATENT TROLL REVOLUTION
years. 126 Uncertainty raises costs for all parties involved in the patent system,
and lowering uncertainty will reduce opportunities for strategic behavior. 127
To remove this uncertainty causing the various problems in patent law,
various patent reforms are on the table every session for Congress to
consider. 128 The most drastic proposed change is making America a first-to-
file patent system instead of the current first-to-conceive system, but the
first-to-file system is what is already used in every other major industrial
country. 129 Setting limitations on continuing applications is also a reform
with plenty of support because Lemelson and other inventors have abused the
continuation system famously for the last forty years. 130 A more subtle
change Congress has seriously considered is publishing all applications
within 18 months of the filing date in order to allow other companies to have
notice of the patent as soon as reasonably possible.131 This early publishing
system would reduce the time a company may infringe unknowingly, and
hopefully this would reduce the number of lawsuits brought overall. 132 One
final rule that was on the table in recent years was modification of the rules
126 A main focus of Bessen and Meurer is to eliminate the sources of uncertainty,
and this could be more easily done if the judicial branch could become truly consistent in
patent law. Id. at 2-3.
127 The main source of extra cost is the litigation costs of enforcing or challenging
patents in court, which can range from $500,000 to $4 million (median) based on how
much patent value is at risk. Id. at 2.
128 Robert M.M. Seto, A Federal Judge's View of the Most Important Changes in
Patent Law in Half-A-Century, 11 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 141, 145-46 (2006). Seto gives a
thorough analysis of thirteen separate patent reforms offered in the Patent Reform Act of
2005, but he also opposes any changes.
129 Id. at 146. This change would not only make United States patent law match
other large countries, it would also remove a lot of cost and conflict at the PTO because
no more priority disputes involving proving the date of invention would be necessary.
130 Id. at 148-49. Continuation procedures can extend the time from conception to
patent expiration to a whopping 44 years (which is what Lemelson did many times). This
is contrary to the patent law system goal of removing unnecessary delays between patent
application and patent issuance.
131 This reform was discussed at length at the Ohio State I/S Symposium on Patent
Reform, but most of the panelists at that conference were against patent reforms in
general (the primary presenters were university researchers and representatives from
Battelle, a small research and development company that stays in business only by
licensing inventions). The benefits of early publication far outweigh the small detriment
to small companies which hope to have a long time to fully test every aspect of an
invention before finally applying for a patent.
132 Seto, supra note 128, at 150. Seto thinks continuation procedures do not need to
be eliminated because the problems of heavy and irrelevant litigation could be solved
better by early publishing of all patent applications.
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for granting injunctions in patent cases, but the eBay decision accomplished
this reform in the judiciary instead of in Congress. 133 Each of these reforms
has created heavy disputes for two reasons: (1) small company inventors and
universities are inherently disfavored by these new patent rule proposals; and
(2) different industries are affected in vastly different ways if any patent law
is changed.' 34 Despite the opposition making strong points, some patent
reform is likely to occur either in Congress or through Supreme Court
decisions within the next few years. 135
The patent reform movement and the alternative dispute resolution
community actually may have a unique joint opportunity to help each other
in this circumstance. ADR use needs to increase in the patent law field, and
the patent reform movement could drive Congress to seriously consider
adding mandatory ADR in patent disputes. 136 As discussed above, the patent
reform movement has not been able to break through Congressional debates
and advance into making law yet. 137 Many controversial pieces of legislation
make it through Congress by "piggy-backing" on the heels of another bill
with high popular and social support. 138 Consequently, a large ADR
provision could garner enough support to force through some of these other
133 Id. at 155-56. The language in the 2005 Patent Reform Act condoned the very
equitable test that the Supreme Court ended up choosing.
134Al of this information comes from the 11S Symposium on Patent Reform
referred to in previous notes, but the opposition and reasons are clear. Part of the problem
is that the definition of patent troll activity as licensing without practicing is too broad
and covers these universities and small research firms. Even if certain reforms such as
early publication do hurt some parties such as universities, Congress must balance the
equities before just dismissing any change. See Seto, supra note 129, at 161-63.
135 Id. at 145. The consensus for patent reform is building quickly every year, so it
would be hard to conclude otherwise.
136 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
137 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
138 A perfect example of this phenomenon happened in late 2006 when Senator Bill
Frist wanted to force through legislation banning online gambling, but nobody in
Congress supported this view. Frist then pulled strings to add the gambling ban into a
completely unrelated, large port security bill which was in the best interests of national
security and certain to overwhelmingly pass both houses of Congress. Frist probably put
the security of the country at risk by "piggy-backing" his disfavored bill on the port
security bill. Nevertheless, the port security bill passed, and now bank funding of online
gambling is illegal. See I. Nelson Rose, Congress Makes Sausages, I 1 GAMING L. REv. 1,
1-2 (2007).
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patent reforms.139 The ADR community should not waste this opportunity to
join the patent reform movement and get ADR-based reforms added to patent
law.
One final type of patent reform works so well with ADR processes that it
merits a little consideration. Other countries such as Japan have open
opposition proceedings run by the patent office, much like the United States
PTO has for trademarks. 140 These opposition procedures allow for challenges
by the public against newly-granted patents in front of the USPTO, who may
have better access to applicable prior art.' 41 This opposition process is
significantly less expensive than going through a patent litigation, and the
process removes uncertainty or bad patents from the system up front. 142 ADR
comes into the process because opposition procedures are binding
determinations and are structured like arbitration.1 43 The ADR community
could easily recommend arbitration standards to solidify the drive to add
opposition procedures through patent reform. 144 The ADR community's
expertise in arbitration could help the USPTO train patent examiners
properly to be arbitrators in opposition proceedings. 145 This reform is
probably the least opposed by various technological industries which deal
139 The trends of ADR bills passing and the bipartisan support of ADR indicate that
patent reformers could pull a Bill Frist-like action to force some reforms through. See
supra note 138 and accompanying text.
140 Seto, supra note 128, at 177-78. Seto does point out that the USPTO does allow
a somewhat similar system called reexamination, but this procedure does not provide any
of the same benefits as the European or Japanese opposition procedures. Id. at 146, 178.
141 Benjamin & Rai, supra note 121, at 270. This is one reform that has widespread
support already in Congress and is almost certain to pass in the next five years once
technical and cost details are worked out.
142 Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why "Bad" Patents Survive in the Market and
How Should We Change? The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61,
105-06 (2006). The analysis can be hard to follow in this empirical study, but graphically
it is clear that costs are lowered and patent applicants and others opposing the
applications have a much broader range of choices to consider when a dispute arises in
the opposition system.
143 Id. at 107-08. Kesan also clarified many points in his presentation at the I/S
Symposium on Patent Reform at Ohio State, and he is traveling around as much as
possible to spread the good word about this reform.
144 See supra Part IV.A.
145 The new patent examiners or arbitrators that would be hired if opposition
procedures were added to the USPTO would need full training in technical fields they
practice in as well as arbitrator training. This process could be a little expensive up front,
but the long term benefits seem too good to pass up now.
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with patent law, so ADR should support and work with patent reform
proponents in this debate.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although there are many solutions to the eBay problem, the ADR
community should come out in force behind one or two of them. The easiest
and best possible solutions to rising patent troll litigation are spreading good
news about ADR through mandatory CLE or law school training, and
encouraging Congress to reform the patent laws in such a way to increase
ADR opportunities in patent disputes. A united front to continue building
positive relationships with the federal court system and patent lawyers is
crucial to continuing the rapid development ADR has had in this field. The
patent troll problem will probably never fully go away with the patent
economy America has in place today, but the spawned problem of increased
litigation is one the ADR community can easily handle. With great
opportunity comes great responsibility, and the ADR community should not
miss this chance to forever improve the patent law arena. There is more than
just hope in the future of ADR and patent law, and that is something
everyone can be excited about.
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